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ABSTRACT
Design, Simulation, and Analysis of Substation Automation Networks. (May 2011)
Elangovan Kembanur Natarajan, B.E., Anna University, India
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Alexander Sprintson
Society depends on computer networks for communication. The networks were
built to support and facilitate several important applications such as email, web
browsing and instant messaging. Recently, there is a significant interest in leveraging
modern local and wide area communication networks for improving reliability and
performance in critical infrastructures. Emerging critical infrastructure applications,
such as smart grid, require a certain degree of reliability and Quality of Service (QoS).
Supporting these applications requires network protocols that enable delay sensitive
packet delivery and packet prioritization. However, most of the traditional networks
are designed to provide best effort service without any support for QoS. The protocols
used in these networks do not support packet prioritization, delay requirements and
reliability.
In this thesis, we focus on the design and analysis of communication protocols
for supporting smart grid applications. In particular, we focus on the Substation
Automation Systems (SAS). Substations are nodes in the smart grid infrastructure
that help the in transportation of power by connecting the transmission and distri-
bution lines. The SAS applications are configured to operate with minimal human
intervention. The SAS monitors the line loads continuously. If the load values are
too high and can lead to damage, the SAS declares those conditions as faults. On
fault detection, the SAS must take care of the communication with the relay to open
the circuit to prevent any damage. These messages are of high priority and require
reliable, delay sensitive delivery. There is a threshold for the delay of these messages,
iv
and a slight increase in the delay above the threshold might cause severe damages.
Along with such high priority messages, the SAS has a lot of background traffic as
well. In spite of the background traffic, the substation network must take care of
delivering the priority messages on time. Hence, the network plays a vital role in the
operation of the substation.
Networks designed for such applications should be analyzed carefully to make
sure that the requirements are met properly. We analyzed and compared the perfor-
mance of the SAS under different network topologies. By observing the characteristics
of the existing architectures, we came up with new architectures that perform better.
We have suggested several modifications to existing solutions that allow significant
improvement in the performance of the existing solutions.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Computer networks have become an important backbone for today’s society. In fact,
economic activities and social life have seen huge evolution with new developments
in computer networks. The traditional networks were designed to support several
important user applications like email, web browsing and instant messaging. These
networks were built with the notion of fairness i.e. the network should try to serve all
the users with equal data rate. The users are provided with the type of service known
as the best effort service. Best effort service does not guarantee Quality of Service
(QoS) or data delivery to the users. It does not prioritize between the users as well.
It tries to provide the best possible service to the user depending upon the load in
the network. It also tries to ensure fairness to all the users in the network. However,
with the introduction of multimedia messages, the concept of delay sensitive traffic
came into play. These data types are provided with User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
which sacrifices reliability and authentication for reduced delay.
Recently, there has been a significant interest in using the modern local and
wide area communication networks in critical infrastructures to improve performance
and reliability. These critical infrastructures require a certain degree of reliability and
QoS. The network protocol that supports these applications should also provide guar-
antees for timely packet delivery and packet prioritization. These networks should
also be interoperable with the traditional networks. With the growth of such infras-
tructures, the applications have increased requirements. However, these applications
cannot deviate entirely from the traditional protocol if they are to achieve interoper-
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2ability. In this thesis, we focus on designing networks to satisfy the requirements of
one such critical infrastructure, the smart grid.
Smart grid is an electricity network that uses digital technologies to handle its
communications. This network is used for monitoring line loads, transmission and
distribution of power. The network comprises of substations and National Control
Center (NCC). The substations are used for transmission and distribution of power.
The NCC takes care of monitoring the operations of substations and the line loads in
each substation. The older models of this network used telephone lines for communi-
cation between NCC and substations [1]. The components inside the substation were
hard-wired for communication. However, these methods meant costly wiring, con-
stant human intervention and slower performance. Recently, the smart grid network
has moved to modern computer networks to handle the digital communication.
Among the smart grid applications, we focus particularly on communications
within a substation. These substations have been designed to operate with minimal
human intervention and hence they are known as the Substation Automation Sys-
tems (SAS). IEC 61850 protocol defines the requirements associated with the SAS
application. The application has some time critical messages and a lot of less priority
messages in the network. These time critical messages need a certain degree of relia-
bility and QoS. One such time critical message is the trip message which informs the
relays to open the breakers whenever there is a fault. The IEC protocol defines the
threshold for the delay of these messages. However, it does not provide any guidance
to guarantee the message delivery performance [2].
The delay of these time critical message is probably the most important aspect
to make note of in the SAS application. If a trip message is lost or if it experiences
excessive delay and exceeds the threshold, the relay will fail to open the breaker
on time and this can lead to severe damage and financial loss. Hence, the entire
3architecture of the substation can be termed feasible only if it complies with the needs
of the priority messages. Correspondingly, the substation network should be designed
to guarantee all the requirements of these messages. The practical substations use
bus ethernet and switched ethernet for communications. Reference [3] provides a
difference in the requirements of the ethernet used in substation compared to the
normal office ethernet. This clearly explains the need for a detailed design of the
substation network.
Hence, the main requirements for the network include prioritization of messages,
reliable and guaranteed delivery of the critical messages [3]. At the same time, the
network should ensure that the number of components needed to build the architec-
ture should be small because with the increase in the number of components, the
reliability of the network decreases [4]. Another way of improving reliability is by
introducing redundancies in the network. However, this increases the cost associated
with developing the network. Hence, the ideal substation network should be reliable,
provide packet prioritization, guarantee QoS and should be cost effective. In this
thesis, we provide methods to improve the performances in the Bus ethernet model
of the substation. By modifying the back off of the users based on their priority, the
delay of the time critical messages can be significantly improved. We also provide
new architectures using existing Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) to ensure a
better behavior than the practical models. By going with the wireless network, we
achieved performance characteristics close to the wired networks. This means the
delay performance of the WLAN model was comparable to the best topology with
respect to delay and the reliability performance of the WLAN model was comparable
to the best topology in terms of reliability. We did reliability studies on these models
to confirm the results.
4A. Motivation
Even though the analysis of delay in the substation network is important, until [3]
there was no proper simulation method to analyze the delays in the network. The
network designed by them was a futuristic approach which explored the possibilities
of incorporating more messages in the network. However, even [3] does not provide
an accurate model for implementing practical substations. Hence, we built a practical
model of the substation in OPNET. While doing so, we realized the complexities in
implementing the current network technologies in the substation and the importance
of the trade-off between reliability and performance. This presented a significant
challenge in designing substation network. The models built in this thesis are based
on the practical substation model that was developed in OPNET.
B. Related Work
The related work for this thesis can be split into three categories:
1. Works related to the analysis of substation models.
2. Works related to the modifying backoff timer in bus ethernet
3. Works related to exploring the possibility of wireless models and reliability
models in substations.
The whole idea of substation automation gained popularity with the introduction of
IEC 61850 protocol. However, the feasibility of IEC 61850 was showed by [5]. This
was the first paper to consider the requirements of the IEC 61850 and explored the
protocol’s feasibility. Ethernet was explored as a possibility for communications in
substation in [6] and it was found to have sufficient performance characteristics to
support substation communication. Reference [2] criticized the IEC 61850 protocol
5of providing no guidance to describe the characteristics of the delivery performance.
None of the papers proposed a proper way to analyze the performance of the substa-
tions. [3] was the first work that provided a solid way to simulate substation network.
The topologies for substations have not changed after these works.
The concept of modifying the backoff scheme of the bus ethernet has been ex-
plored by a lot of papers. Reference [7] looks at a bus ethernet in terms of it’s
multimedia traffic load and data traffic load. The paper proposes a backoff scheme to
improve the overall performance based on these loads. Reference [8] assigns priorities
to packets similar to 802.1p. Each packet has a weight associated with it and the
weights play a role in modifying the backoff. However, this paper does not give anal-
ysis based on the number of users or traffic load. Reference [9] proposes a complete
new mode it the network known as RETHER mode. The LAN switches from CSMA
to RETHER mode to transmit real time traffic. Apart from these, a few papers ana-
lyze the possibility of backoff scheme in Wireless network. Reference [10] talks about
schedulers based on the backpressure. Reference [11] talks about modifying the slot
time dynamically based on the type and the length of the packets.
The idea of expanding smartgrid up to the consumer’s home resulted in anal-
ysis of possibility of wireless protocols in smart grid. Reference [12] describes the
requirements for implementing smartgrid over wireless network and also enlists a few
of the wireless protocols that could be used in smartgrid. Reference [13] was one
of the first papers to suggest using WLAN in substations. However, the author did
not specify architectures for the wireless model. The ABB patent provided a very
important breakthrough concerning implementation of wireless schemes in substation
[13]. They came up with special waveguides to block electromagnetic disturbances to
enable Wireless LAN to perform well.
6The concept of reliability in substations has been explored in a lot of papers.
Reference [14] looks at the architecture of the existing topologies and analyzes the
reliability. The authors also look at the reliability of the substation in wireless ad-hoc
model. However, the reliability analyses were simple without any actual numerical
results. Reference [15] suggests architectures known as Reliability Block Diagrams to
calculate the reliability of networks. This method is employed in [4] and an analysis
of the effect of redundancies and simpler models are given. Reference [16] performs a
more critical analysis by taking into effect the concept of repairable systems.
C. Outline of the Thesis
In Chapter II, we introduce the basics of substations and the components of the
practical substation. We also mention the system model and the topologies that exist
currently in substations. In Chapter III, we talk about the simulator, OPNET used
in this thesis. We also talk about the models and nodes designed in the OPNET for
simulation purposes.
In Chapter IV, we start to talk about the contributions of the thesis. We talk
about the scheme used in the delay aware backoff and how we derive at the scheme. In
Chapter V, we talk about the wireless architectures, their implementations, challenges
and extensions. In Chapter VI, we talk about reliability technique and move on to
propose the reliability block diagram for each architecture and evaluate them.
Finally in Chapter VII, we show the simulation results and compare the perfor-
mances of different architectures. In Chapter VIII, we give the conclusion and the
future work possible in this area.
7CHAPTER II
SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEMS
Substations in electrical grids are devices which are used for connecting transmission
and distribution lines. They are used in transmission and distribution of power. So a
typical substation is supposed to receive the electricity and based on the location of
the substations, it either needs to step up the voltage or step down the voltage and
transmit the power down the line. Correspondingly, the substations have either a step
up transformer or step down transformer and lines to distribute the load. Hence we
can compare the substation to a router in a communication network. Both of them
receive data, process them and send it to the destination. In case of anomalies, the
router can just discard the data or perform some action but a substation cannot do
such tasks. So with the involvement of power, a substation needs to have some kind
of fault detection, fault tolerance and recovery mechanisms. This combined with the
fact that some substations are deployed in rough and inaccessible terrains, Substation
Automation Systems (SAS) was introduced.
A. IEC 61850
SAS uses Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) to control it’s functionalities. These
IEDs are nothing but a microprocessor based controller that are capable of performing
various functions. Various types of IEDs were designed to perform specific tasks.
Each of these IEDs used to follow different protocols to communicate based on the
type of task they were supposed to perform. This led to a lot of complexities when
the IEDs tried to operate together. Costly protocol converters were used to ensure
interoperability of IEDs [17]. These protocol converters also introduced delay in
the network. To solve all these problems, a common protocol known as the IEC
861850 was introduced. This protocol has been standardized internationally and all
the communication inside the substation follows this protocol including the digital
communications that happen in the process level of the substation. IEC 61850 used
ethernet based technology to be the communication network. This protocol also
defines the requirements for various communication and even takes care of substation
automation in terms of project management, conformance testing, etc [3]. Thus IEC
61850 reduces the cost of the substation by avoiding protocol converters. It also
establishes interoperability with minimum delay.
B. Role of IEDs
There are many types of IEDs in the substation network. Some of the IEDs include
the Merged Unit (MU) IED, Protection IED, Control IED and the Breaker IED. As
said before, each type of IED has a specific set of tasks to perform. The MU IED
is connected to the current and voltage transformers. The function of the MU IED
is to receive the analog current and voltage values from the current and the voltage
transformers. It then samples those values and sends the digitized values to the Pro-
tection IED. The protection IED monitors these values constantly and sends out a
trip message if it detects any anomalies. These trip messages are sent to other protec-
tion IEDs and the corresponding breaker IEDs. The protection IEDs associated with
the detected fault controls the relays to open the circuit to stop the current flow and
hence prevent damage. The breaker IED sends out a Generic Object Oriented Sub-
station Event (GOOSE) message to the entire system informing of the state change
that has occurred in the network. All the three messages discussed here namely,
the sample values, the trip message and the GOOSE message are all considered to
be high priority and time critical messages. Excessive delays in these messages mean
9failure to detect fault or failure to open the circuit and so the consequences are severe.
Apart from these IEDs, there is a Circuit Breaker Monitor (CBM) that monitors the
breaker to see if they have been opened properly. These CBMs and the Protection
IED records the event associated with the failure and sends out those records to the
substation computer.
The MU IED and the Breaker IED belong to the lower level of the substation
known as the process level. The protection IED, control IED and the CBM belong
to the system level of the substation. In the practical substations, the process level
is connected by copper wires and only the system level components of the substation
are connected by the ethernet. Hence the sampled values and the GOOSE message
occur in the hard wires network while the trip message alone occurs in the ethernet.
C. Substation Model
In the system model considered for this thesis, we take into consideration only the
components that come under the ethernet network. The process level of the sub-
station does not come under the ethernet communication network and hence it is
not considered. So we assume that the priority messages like sampled values and
GOOSE message are sent and received properly in the network. Among the system
level components, we define the substation to be divided into three types of bays.
They are the line bays, the bus bays and the transformer bays. Each bus bay and
transformer bay unit consists of one CBM, one protection IED and one control IED.
Correspondingly, each bay unit consists of one relay and breaker each. Since all the
line loads are directly monitored by the line bay, it alone needs to have redundancy to
ensure reliability. Hence, neighboring two line bays share three breakers among them.
This model is known as the one and a half breaker model. In case of a fault, the line
10
Fig. 1. Bus Bay Unit.
bay tries to open both the breakers associated with it. Since it has two breakers,
it needs two CBM to monitor the breakers and so the line bay unit consists of one
protection IED, one control IED and two CBMs. In the substation model considered,
we have 16 line bays, 4 bus bays and 2 transformer bays. These bay units occur in
the switchyard area of the substation. A sample bay unit for bus ethernet is shown
in Fig. 1 and a sample bay unit for switched ethernet is shown in Fig. 2
Along with the switchyard area, the substation consists of the control center.
This center, as the name implies controls the operation of the substation and provides
configurations to the IEDs. This control center also is responsible for conveying
the substation messages to the NCC. Hence the control center acts as the interface
between NCC and the substation. The control center consists of the Human Machine
Interface (HMI), Digital Fault Recorder (DFR), GPS receiver, a substation server
and router. The HMI is nothing but a substation computer that is used to send
configuration messages to the IEDs. It acts as the way for human intervention in the
substation. The DFR receives the sampled values of the current and voltage from
the MU IEDs directly through hardwire and stores them. Whenever there is a fault,
the DFR compiles these values into a record and sends the record file to the HMI
11
Fig. 2. Switched Bay Unit.
through a file transfer. The router is used to connect the substation to the Wide Area
Network (WAN). A line diagram of the substation is shown in Fig. 3. The networking
view of the substation is shown later in the Figs. 4, 5 and 6.
Apart from the trip message, the network also contains file transfer messages,
time synchronization messages and configuration messages. A substation network is
considered practically feasible only if the delay of the trip message lies under a certain
threshold. Hence the primary objective when testing all the developed architectures
is to note the delay of the trip message in that network.
D. Network Topologies in Practical Substation
The components of the switchyard and the control center are built using different
topologies in the practical network. The substation might be connected in either bus
ethernet or switched ethernet. Among the switched ethernet, the substation can be
connected either in Ring topology or the star topology.
The bus ethernet in substation employs 10Mbps or 100Mbps ethernet bus. All
12
Fig. 3. Substation Line Diagram.
the bay units and the control devices are connected to the single bus. Since the bus
connects all the station level components, it is known as the station bus. All the
network messages are exchanged using this bus. The main delays experienced in the
bus ethernet are due to collisions. However, since this model employs less number of
components, it is significantly reliable [4]. The substation model for the bus ethernet
is given in Fig. 4.
The ring and the star topology employs switched ethernet. The way the bay units
are connected to one another varies based on the type of topology. The ring topology
is given in Fig. 5. This topology defines two paths for each bay to communicate
with every other bay. The presence of two separate paths ensures better reliability.
However, the number of switches employed in this scheme is more and the path
from one protection IED to another lies through many switches. Since queuing and
processing at the switches constitute the main cause of delays in switched ethernet,
the delay performance will be a little poor.
The star topology example is given in Fig. 6. This topology has less number
13
Fig. 4. Bus Ethernet Model.
Fig. 5. Switched Ethernet-Ring Topology.
14
Fig. 6. Switched Ethernet-Star Topology.
of switches and has good performance in terms of delay. However, there is just one
path between different nodes and so the reliability is less compared to ring topology.
This is the most preferred of the three with respect to delay performance. However,
practical substations prefer bus ethernet if reliability is the main concern and go for
ring topology in cases where the tradeoff in reliability is not a huge issue.
E. Messages Exchanged
The messages considered in these network consists of the time critical message namely
the trip message. This message is generated in the network whenever faults occur.
This message is sent from the Protection IED which detects the fault to the corre-
sponding protection IED which shares the breaker with the faulty line bay. If the
breakers fail to open, the protection IED tries to open the entire bus bus associated
with the faulty line. This trip message is 16 bytes in size. Once the trip message
15
is sent, the protection IED and the CBMs of the bay unit in question sends error
report to the HMI. These error reports are about 300KB in size and are sent using
the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Similarly, the DFR compiles a report of the values
and sends a file of size 300KB to the HMI through FTP. Apart from these, the HMI
sends a time synchronization message to all the components of the substation every
second. This message is of size 16 bytes as well. Except for the trip message, the
other messages are considered to be background messages.
16
CHAPTER III
OPNET MODELS
This chapter gives details about the modeling and simulation of the substation net-
work in OPNET. By simulating different topologies, we can measure the delay per-
formance and see if different models can be implemented without compromising the
delay performance. OPNET can be established as a great way to compare the perfor-
mances of these topologies. OPNET modeler is chosen over other simulators because
of its extensive model library, user friendly interface and free-license for academic
research. It is also the industry’s leading environment for network modeling and
simulation, facilitating in the design and study of various communication networks,
models, protocols and applications with a lot flexibility and scalability. OPNET’s
library even includes models for devices based on companies like Cisco, Juniper, etc.
Apart from the extensive library, OPNET has different editors that form a hier-
archy. This hierarchical series of editors enable easy modeling of new protocols and
device models. The top most level of the editors is the project editor. This editor is
used to develop the overall scenario of the communication network. All the devices
and components of the network can be drawn here and the communication links can
be specified. Apart from these, the standard application like FTP, E mail, etc can
be defined in the project editor. The next level of editor is the node editor. This
is used to modify the node models of the devices in the network. The node model
of each device comprises a combination of process models that are cooperate with
one another and together characterize the functions of the device. The node models
contain the various attributes of the device and these attributes can be modified by
the user.
The lower most level in the hierarchy of the editors is the process editor. This
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editor allows the modification of the process models. These process models comprises
of a series of Finite State Machines (FSM). These FSMs together define the flow the
process in the process model. The coding inside the process editor is done using
C/C++. The editor defines places to write the Header block, Function block, State
variables and the temporary variables used in the editor. The FSMs have blocks
for enter executables and exit executables. Whenever the process enters or exits the
FSM, the corresponding executables are executed. Hence they form the ideal tool to
define new models. Along with the hierarchical series of editors, the OPNET modeler
also has packet format editor to defines packet models, link and path editors to defines
connectivity, etc.
A. IED Modeling in OPNET
Models were developed in OPNET for Protection IED, MU IED and Breaker IED. The
models for CBM, Control IED and DFR and HMI were taken from existing models
and modified accordingly. Although all these models were available for designing the
substation, MU IED and breaker IED were not used in the simulations because they
do not occur in the substation as a part of the network.
The node model of the protection IED consists of the normal OSI seven layers
for specifying the FTP traffic in the IED. Along with the OSI layer, three specific
process models were developed. These are the Trip source, eth mac intf sas and the
Sink processes. As the name suggests, the Trip source defines the generation of the
trip messages. Since actual faults cannot be detected, the time points at which trip
messages need to be generated are obtained from the user and trip messages are
generated at those times. The trip messages are usually sent four times to make
sure that at least one gets through [3]. The format of the packets were defined in
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Fig. 7. Protection IED Node Model.
the packet editor and they are sent out four times on the specified times. The node
model of the protection IED is shown in Fig. 7.
The process model of the trip message is shown in the Fig. 8. An initial state
is defined where the time points given by the user are obtained. The process moves
on to the OFF state and the timer is started for the first trip message during this
time. As soon as the timer expires, the process moves to the ON state. In this state,
the process generates and sends out four trip messages to the eth mac intf sas model.
The eth mac intf sas receives the trip message and sends it out to the mac layer. So
the priority messages are directly injected into the ethernet layer rather than going
through the normal layers. The Sink process model is defined to receive the trip
messages sent out by other IEDs. On receiving messages, the sink checks if it is a
trip message. If so, it registers the end to end delay of the message. We note the end
to end delay of all trip messages and give these values when the simulation ends.
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Fig. 8. Protection IED Process Model.
Fig. 9. DFR Attributes.
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For the other IEDs, we define applications that specify the traffic they are sup-
posed to generate. We create separate profiles for these applications. OPNET pro-
vides standard node models to create application and profile definitions. Once the
profiles are created, the IEDs have to include these profiles in their attributes to
generate traffic for the specified applications. The DFR and the HMI are similarly
designed to generate necessary messages. A sample profile definition for the DFR is
given in Fig. 9. The figure shows the DFR attribute which uses the profile defined
for the file transfer procedure.
Similar process models were developed for Wireless LAN as well.
21
CHAPTER IV
DELAY AWARE BACKOFF
As mentioned in Chapter II, the bus ethernet model of the substation is the best model
in terms of reliability. Some substations even prefer bus ethernet to the switched eth-
ernet because of this reason. Hence improving delay performance of the bus ethernet
would prove very useful if the network needs to support more messages. Reference
[7] proposes a modified backoff scheme based on the ratio of multimedia traffic to the
data traffic. By taking into account the rates and load of each type of traffic, the
paper tends to improve the overall performance. In this thesis, the main concern is to
improve the priority traffic irrespective of the network load, the load of the priority
traffic or the number of stations.
A. Backoff Scheme
In bus ethernet, all the messages that go around the network use the single bus. In
substation, this bus is the station bus. All the IEDs and the control center devices
are connected to each other through the station bus. The main cause of delays in bus
ethernet is due the collisions. Whenever a packet experiences collision, the sender
starts a timer. The packet is retransmitted after the timer expires. The timer uses
random exponential backoff scheme to make sure that the devices perform well even
if there are many users in the system. The main characteristics behind the backoff of
the bus ethernet is that the whole scheme is decentralized i.e. there is no centralized
coordinator to inform the devices when to send packets. Hence whenever there is a
collision, the devices do not know with whom they have collided and with how many
users they collided.
If performance of the bus ethernet is to be improved, improving the backoff
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scheme is the way to go. The devices in the network should be termed as either a
priority user (real time user) or a non-priority user (best effort user). The basic idea
behind providing priority to the real time users is to decrease the backoff timer for
these users at the cost of increasing the timer for the best effort users. However, care
should be taken to ensure that the delay of best effort users do not increase too much.
Also, if the number of priority users are more in the system, decreasing the backoff
too much would mean increased number of collisions and increased delay among the
real time users. Hence an optimal scheme is needed to ensure proper backoff.
B. System Model and Assumptions
Since we are building the scheme to improve the substation performance, the system
model is taken from the substation network. The trip message is the only high priority
message. Hence only the protection IEDs that sends the trip message are considered
to be real time users. In substations, the occurrence of fault is a fairly rare event and
occurrence of two faults in two separate lines is rare. Any further cases are assumed
almost impossible. So we take only two priority users in our consideration. In bus
ethernet, the backoff and the wait times are based upon the slot times. The slot time
is the time taken for a message to be sent from one end to other of the ethernet.
We assume our system to be discrete for simplicity and that each slot is twice the
slot time. This ensures proper delivery of the message and the sender confirms the
successful delivery within the slot. As we are trying to improve the backoff scheme,
we assume that our system always starts with a one time collision and that the users
start their backoff timer. The one time collision implies that the users do not have
any other high priority message than their single trip message.
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Fig. 10. Backoff Cases.
C. Delay Calculation
First, let us look at what the optimal strategy would be for a system with just two
users. We assume that this is a onetime event. We assume that the users are user
1 and user 2. Let us assume that both the users have some message to send. At
time t0, both users try to send the message in the next slot. Collision occurs and
both users backoff to a random future slot. Let us consider the probability mass
function of the two users to be p1(i) and p2(i). When the two users send the message
again, there may either be another collision or the packet might be sent successfully
as shown in Fig. 10. As the priority users are concerned only with reducing their own
delays, we take into consideration reducing the delay of each individual user rather
than observing the entire system’s delay.
Let us take user 1 into consideration. The Expected number of slots in which
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the user 1 sends the message is given by,
E1(i) =
∞∑
i=1
i · p1(i) (4.1)
The probability of the two users colliding again is given by,
η =
∞∑
i=1
p1(i) · p2(i) (4.2)
Let E[T1] be the average time taken to retransmit. It is given by,
E[T1] =
∞∑
i=1
p1(i)[(1− p2(i))i+ p2(i)(i+ E[T1])] (4.3)
If the left hand side is expanded and Equations on (4.1) and (4.2) are applied,
the equation can be simplified. On simplifying, Equation (4.3) becomes
E[T1] =
∞∑
i=1
E1 + η · T1
This further reduces to
E[T1] =
E1
1− η (4.4)
The expected delay for the second user, user 2 can be similarly derived to be
E[T2] =
E2
1− η
If we assume that both the users are priority users, we can say that p1 = p2.
Hence the Equation (4.1) becomes
E = E2 = E1 =
∞∑
i=1
i · p(i) (4.5)
Correspondingly, Equation (4.2) becomes
η =
∞∑
i=1
p2(i) (4.6)
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D. Optimization
The objective we are trying to achieve is to minimize E[T ]. So the original optimiza-
tion equation is given by,
Minimize,
E[T ] =
E
1− η (4.7)
such that
i=∞∑
i=1
p(i) = 1
p(i) ≥ 0 ∀i
Since the Equation 4.7 is non linear, we solve the optimization in a different way.
For all values of E = α ∈ [1, n(n+1)
2
], we define the minimum collision probability for
each value of α as ηα, where ηα = η|E=α. So the objective now reduces to minimizing
ηα. Finally, we choose optimal α that minimizes the expected delay, E[T ] =
α
1−ηα .
1. The Inner Loop
To minimize the packet collisions i.e. ηα, we can define the conditions for the mini-
mization to be;
1. Choose a value E = α from [1, n(n+1)
2
].
2. The summation of all the probability values that the slots can take should be
equal to one.
We have represented E in Equation (4.5) and η in Equation (4.6). Since we cannot
take the summation till ∞ in these equations, we assume limited support and let the
summations to go on till n. This makes the calculation easier. Having established all
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the conditions, the optimization equation is given as the following.
Minimize,
ηα =
i=n∑
i=1
p(i)2 (4.8)
such that
i=n∑
i=1
i · p(i) ≤ α
i=n∑
i=1
p(i) = 1
p(i) ≥ 0 ∀i
For simplicity, we rewrite the Equations. Minimize,
i=n∑
i=1
x2i (4.9)
such that
i=n∑
i=1
i · xi ≤ α
i=n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0 ∀i
2. KKT Conditions
To solve the optimization Equation 4.8, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are
used. To express the optimization problem in KKT conditions, the problem is modi-
fied as Minimize,
i=n∑
i=1
x2i (4.10)
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such that
i=n∑
i=1
i · xi ≤ α
i=n∑
i=1
xi ≤ 1
−
i=n∑
i=1
xi ≤ −1
Based on Lagrange multiplier method, the dual can be given as
L(x) =
i=n∑
i=1
x2i + v1(
i=n∑
i=1
i · xi − α) + v2(
i=n∑
i=1
xi − 1) + v3(−
i=n∑
i=1
xi + 1) (4.11)
Here v1, v2 and v3 are dual variables such that v1, v2, v3 ≥ 0. Differentiating Equation
(4.11) with respect to xi we get,
xi =
v3 − v2 − i · v1
2
Assuming v3 − v2 = v32 we get,
xi =
v32 − i · v1
2
(4.12)
Differentiating Equation (4.11) with respect to v1, v2 and v3 we get,
i=n∑
i=1
i · xi − α ≤ 0
i=n∑
i=1
xi − 1 ≤ 0
−
i=n∑
i=1
xi + 1 ≤ 0
Based on KKT conditions, multiplying the equations with v1, v2 and v3 gives
v1(
i=n∑
i=1
i · xi − α) = 0 (4.13)
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v2(
i=n∑
i=1
xi − 1) = 0 (4.14)
v3(−
i=n∑
i=1
xi + 1) = 0 (4.15)
In Equation (4.15), v3 cannot be 0 because if v3 is zero, all other variables in Equation
(4.12) should be zero to make sure that the random variables xi are positive. In
Equation (4.13), if v1 is zero, all the xi’s will have the same value according to
Equation (4.12). This case occurs only when the value of α is high i.e. when α ≥
n·(n+1)
2
.
On applying Equation (4.12) and the conditions that v1, v3 6= 0 and v3−v2 = v32,
we get
−v1/2
i=n∑
i=1
i2 + v32/2
i=n∑
i=1
i− α = 0 (4.16)
v1/2
i=n∑
i=1
i− v32/2 · n+ 1 = 0 (4.17)
Solving these two equations with α = 3,n = 10, we get v1 = 2/33 and v32 = 8/15.
Applying these values in Equation (4.12) and applying the condition that xi ≥ 0,
we get the values of xi as x1 = 0.2364, x2 = 0.2061, x3 = 0.1757, x4 = 0.1455,
x5 = 0.1152, x6 = 0.0848, x7 = 0.0545, x8 = 0.0242 and x9 = x10 = 0.
This result has been confirmed by using the same optimization Equation (4.8)
in the CPLEX optimization software of MATLAB. The optimization distribution
according to MATLAB was the plot shown in Fig. 11. So we can imply that the
optimal distribution for backoff timer for the priority users is a linear distribution.
The probability of retransmission linearly decreases with the increase in slot numbers.
Since the optimization equation is convex, the minima given by the MATLAB
is the optimal minimum. In CPLEX, the quadratic optimization function is used to
solve the problem.
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Fig. 11. Optimal Distribution for Backoff.
Fig. 12. Alpha vs. Expected Delay.
3. The Outer Loop
Optimizing η still leaves the question of optimum value of α. The optimization of η
is run for various values of α from [1, n(n+1)
2
] to determine the optimal value of α for
which the delay is minimum. This experiment is shown in Fig. 12.
The Optimal value for α was thus found to be 1.6. The corresponding proba-
bility distribution was found for this value of α and this gives the optimal backoff
distribution for the system model.
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CHAPTER V
WIRELESS MODELS
In Chapter 2, we mention that the substations are deployed in rough terrains. The
terrain along with the fact that there are a lot of wired connection means that the
cost of wiring is quite high in substations [13]. The wiring between the switchyard
and the control center is particularly costly because of the distance between them.
Hence by moving to wireless network, the cost of wiring in the substation can be
significantly reduced. WLAN is the wireless substitute for ethernet network. So we
explore the possibility of employing WLAN based substations.
A. Challenges
Security is one of main issues in any network. By going for WLAN network, there
is a possibility of third party users getting access to the messages transferred. To
avoid these situations, Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) can be included to improve
security in WLAN. Also, WLAN networks are sensitive to ElectroMagnetic (EM)
disturbances. Considering that the substations hold power lines and power devices,
the possibility of EM disturbances are quite high. However, Reference [13] talks
about a waveguide specifically developed by ABB for industrial purposes such as
these. These waveguides block the EM disturbances and the WLAN can operate
without any disturbances.
WLAN employs Access Points (AP) as the coordinator for the systems in the
network. The range of the typical AP is about 100m. Substations usually cover a
distance of around 125m. However this varies with substation capabilities. The range
of WLAN might decrease if there are surrounding devices using the same frequency.
Hence the area around the substation should not have any other antenna based equip-
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ments that operate in the same frequency as the AP. However, since the substations
usually occur in remote areas, this should not be a huge factor.
B. Architectures
One of the basic architecture that can be used for wireless scheme is to use a single AP
to connect all the devices in the substation. So all the devices in the model given in
Figs. 5 and 6 need to have wireless transceivers. In single AP model, the reliability will
be comparable to bus ethernet. However, the delay will not be as worse as bus model
because WLAN uses centralized scheme to transmit messages with reduced collisions.
The layout of the single AP model is shown in Fig. 13. Apart from the changes in the
physical channel, there is no other change in the network. The messages that occur
in the network and the conditions during which each message occur remain the same
in wireless model as well.
C. Model Extensions
The wireless model has advantages like reduced cost, better reliability-delay tradeoff
and ease of deployment. Still the architecture can be improved further by going for
multiple APs or a partial wired-wireless network. If multiple APs are used, the traffic
load can be divided between the access points and the delay can be improved further.
Since each AP can cover the entire substation, they can also be considered as the
redundant device in the network. Thus the reliability is improved as well but there
is a small delay when the network is reconfigured to figure out the new paths to each
device. An example for multiple AP network is given in Fig. 14. As shown in the
figure, we connect the components of the control center through a switch directly to
the two APs. This reduces the delay for the messages sent by the HMI to the devices.
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Fig. 13. Single AP Model.
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Fig. 14. Multiple AP Model.
We cannot afford to have too many APs in the system which will decrease the range
of each AP and increase the cost of implementation as well.
Even by going with multiple APs, the delay performance cannot be better than
the star topology. To match the performance of star topology and still keep the wiring
cost to a minimum, a partial wired/wireless topology is developed. The architecture
for the wired/wireless topology is given in Fig. 15. This topology has the switchyard
connections the same as in the star topology. However, the switches are connected to
an AP rather than the control center. All the devices in the control center connect
to the AP. This ensures that the high priority messages occur through the wired
network and the low priority messages occur through the wireless medium. The
delay performance is improved for this model but the reliability is compromised.
Thus the only advantage of implementing wireless in this architecture is the decrease
of implementation cost.
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Fig. 15. Wired/Wireless Model.
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CHAPTER VI
RELIABILITY STUDIES
Reliability is one of the important aspects of the substations. According to Reference
[18], the reliability in substations is divided into two aspects namely dependability and
security. Dependability is defined as the degree of certainty with which the relay can
be said to operate correctly. Security on the other hand is the degree of certainty with
which the relay will not operate incorrectly. Lack of either dependability or security
could compromise the system. If the substation is not dependable, the circuits will
not be opened during faults resulting in severe damage and financial loss. If the
substation is not secure, the circuits will be opened even during normal operation
and this could result in power loss.
Since we are dealing with only the network aspect of substation, we are not
simulating actual fault occurrences and fault detection. So there is no way to calculate
the degree of security in our model. However, we could calculate the dependability
of the system we design based on the delay performance and system failure.
• If the delay of the trip message crosses the threshold, then the trip message
does not reach the protection IED in time and so relays are not opened in time.
• If there is a failure in a switch or link, the trip message does not reach the
destination and so the relays do not open.
So we can assume that these are the two cases under which the dependability of
the system is compromised. The failure probability of the entire network can be
calculated, the increase of delay in the trip message can only be noted from the
simulations.
36
A. Reliability Block Diagram
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) [19] gives the overview of the devices in the network
which need to perform correctly for the system to succeed. Based on redundancies and
the paths defined from the sender to the destination, the RBD of the network varies.
By drawing the RBD of each architecture, the system reliability can be determined. [4]
assumes a few general architectures of substation network and calculates the system
reliability.
Once the RBD is derived, we can use the network reduction procedure [15] to
find out the failure rate, repair rate, system unavailability and system availability.
Since we are concentrating only on the network aspect of the substation, we derive
the RBD model by including only the networking components of the substation. If
we take Rsys(t) be the reliability of the system and Qsys(t) be the unreliability of the
system, we can say that
Qsys(t) = 1−Rsys(t)
pi(t) is the reliability and λi is the constant failure rate of a component i. pi(t) is
given by,
pi(t) = e
−λit
The failure rate of all the ethernet media are taken as 0.003year−1 and the failure
rate of the rest of the components are taken to be 0.01year−1 [4]. The time period is
chosen as 1000 hours.
1. Bus Topology
In bus topology, the trip message from one protection IED reaches the other protection
IEDs through the bus alone. Hence the RBD consists of the bus and the taps used
to connect the sender IED to the bus and the receiver IED to the bus. The RBD is
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Fig. 16. RBD for Bus Topology.
shown in Fig. 16. The reliability of the tap is ptap and the reliability of the bus is
pbus. The system reliability is given by,
Rsys = pbus · p2tap (6.1)
Applying the failure rates of the individual components, the system reliability is
found to be, Rsys = 0.9982.
2. Ring Topology
The topology for ring network is shown in Fig. 5. In this topology, the trip message
can have two paths to reach a protection IED from another. So irrespective of the
protection IED chosen, the RBD have to include all the switches and their connecting
links. The RBD diagram for the ring topology is shown in Fig. 17. As we can see, the
backup path is drawn in parallel to the original path and the system failure happens
only if both the paths fail. The reliability of the ethernet media is pem and the
reliability of the switch is psw. The system reliability is given by,
Rsys(t) = p
2
em · psw2(pnem · pnsw + pem − pn+1em · pnsw)
Rsys = p
n+2
em · pn+2sw + p3em · p2sw − pn+3em · pn+2sw (6.2)
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Fig. 17. RBD for Ring Topology.
For the assumed model with 23 switches in the ring, the reliability equation is
as follows,
Rsys = p
24
em · p24sw + p3em · p2sw − p25em · p24sw (6.3)
Applying the failure rates of the individual components, the system reliability is
found to be, Rsys = 0.9970.
3. Star Topology
In star topology, the protection IEDs of the similar bay units are connected by a
single switch. However, the protection IEDs of the other bay units are connected
through a series of 3 switches. So the RBD considers the worst case and includes
the 3 switches and their connecting links. The RBD is shown in Fig. 18 and the
corresponding system reliability is given by,
Rsys = p
4
em · p3sw (6.4)
Applying the failure rates of the individual components, the system reliability is
found to be, Rsys = 0.9952.
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Fig. 18. RBD for Star Topology.
4. Wireless Models
The subsections 1, 2 and 3 give the reliability of the exiting models. Now we focus
on the wireless models built for this thesis and calculate their reliability.
For the single AP model, the trip message has to travel through AP to the
destination. Since the IEDs use a wireless card to connect to the AP, a failure in
the wireless card might prevent the protection IED from sending the message. So we
include the possibility of failure in the IED itself. The RBD model for the single AP
is shown in Fig. 19. The reliability of AP is pap and the protection IED is ppr. So the
system reliability can be given as
Rsys = pap · p2pr (6.5)
Applying the failure rates of the individual components, the system reliability is
found to be, Rsys = 0.9982.
For the second architecture with two APs, the architecture is designed such that
the trip message need only be sent to the protection IED of the same AP. Also, the
second AP can be taken as the redundant network and hence it is drawn parallel to
the original AP. The RBD is shown in Fig. 20. The reliability of the system is given
by,
Rsys = p
2
pr(2pap − p2ap)
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Fig. 19. RBD for Single AP Model.
Fig. 20. RBD for Multiple AP Model.
Rsys = 2pap · p2pr − p2ap · p2pr (6.6)
Applying the failure rates of the individual components, the system reliability is
found to be, Rsys = 0.9993.
Finally we have the architecture which combines the wired and wireless scheme.
This topology is the same as the star topology in terms of the path traveled by the
trip message. Hence the reliability of the system is the same as Equation 6.4. The
final system reliability is also the same as star topology.
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CHAPTER VII
SIMULATION RESULTS
In this chapter, we look at the results of various types of simulations performed. Three
kinds of studies were performed in this thesis, namely delay performance, delay aware
backoff and reliability. So we present these three observations in separate sections.
A. Delay Performance
For the study of delay performance, we take in to consideration the following sce-
nario. The simulation is performed for 20s. The HMI sends out time synchronization
messages to all the devices once every second. One of the protection IEDs of the line
bay is made to send a trip message at the 10th second of the simulation time. The
protection IED and the corresponding CBMs associated with it sends out files of size
300kb to the HMI after the trip message is sent. The DFR also sends a file of size
300kb to the HMI. The trip message delay is noted for the different topologies under
these circumstances. The delay performance of the bus topology, ring topology, star
topology, single AP model, multiple AP model and wired/wireless architecture are
given in Fig. 21. As we can see, the delay of the star topology and the wired/wireless
topology are similar. Also, these delay values are the best performing ones. Also, we
can see that the delays of the wireless model are comparable to the ring topology in
terms of delay. The bus topology is the worst performing one. Even though the de-
lays of wireless architecture are not equal to star, they provide an architecture which
combines the reliability of the bus model and the performance of the ring topology.
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Fig. 21. Trip Message Delays.
B. Delay Aware Backoff
For testing the delay aware backoff, a discrete model was built in MATLAB. The
scenario consists of 10 users out of which 2 users are assigned as priority users. These
priority users follow the delay aware backoff for α = 1.6. The best effort users follow
the normal random exponential backoff scheme. In each slot, all the users decide
on generating packets using a probability value assigned. Since the priority packets
occur rarely in the network, we assign the probability 0.1 for the priority packets.
The normal users generate packets at probability 0.7. These packets are queued up
by the user and they are sent one after another similar to normal ethernet. This
system was run for 100,000 slots and the delay for the real time users and the best
effort users are determined. The result of this simulation is shown in Fig. 22.
As we can see, the priority users perform very well when compared to the best
effort users. This model introduces more priority packet in to the network than
a practical substation. Still the delay aware backoff scheme performs well. Hence
implementing this strategy in bus ethernet will improve delay significantly.
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Fig. 22. Delay Aware Backoff Performance.
Fig. 23. System Reliability of Various Models vs. Time.
Fig. 24. Comparison of Performances for Various Architectures.
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C. Reliability
In chapter VI, we analyzed the reliability of different topologies for mission time
of 1000 hours. To obtain a more comprehensive result, the reliability values were
calculated for various mission times. The simulation was performed in MATLAB.
The reliability of the various topologies is noted for each time and are plotted. As the
performance of single AP model and the bus topology are same and the performance of
the wired/wireless architecture and star topology are same, we plot only one instance
for these architectures. The result obtained for the system reliability is shown in
Fig. 23
As we can see, the reliability of the wireless architectures are better than the
ring and star topology. So the wireless architectures have a better delay-reliability
tradeoff than the traditional architectures. This is shown in the Fig. 24.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we looked at the performance of the substation under different topolo-
gies. We focused on the delay characteristics of the priority message and the reliability
of the substation and proposed new architectures which perform well in both the at-
tributes. We could say that the multiple AP model could very well replace ring or
bus topology because it has better performance both in terms of delay and reliability.
When we compare the multiple AP model with the star topology, it performs a lot
better in terms of reliability but at a slight increase in delay. However, the cost of
implementation of the multiple AP model is significantly reduced because of minimal
wiring. So it could very well replace star topology.
IEC 61850 is a vast protocol and implementing substation over ethernet is a
relatively new concept. So there are numerous possibilities for future work. We
analyzed only the communication inside the substations. However, smart grid network
comprises of numerous substations exchanging data with one another and with NCC.
So the model can be expanded to communication outside the substation. Even within
the substation, the practical implementation does not include all the messages in the
ethernet network. For example, the sampled values from MU IED could very well
be a part of the network. Similarly the GOOSE message can also be incorporated
into the network. To implement these, the designed models need to be expanded.
Since these messages are also priority messages, their delay characteristics need to be
studied thoroughly before implementation.
The time synchronization designed in all the models in this thesis uses sim-
pler protocol like Network Time Protocol. Studies are made regarding implementing
IEEE 1588, Precision Time Protocol in the substation. Our design can be modified
46
to implement 1588 as well. Finally, the wireless models specified uses WLAN for
communication. However, other wireless technologies like Zigbee, WIMAX and LTE
could be explored.
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